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ABSTRACT
SWORD AND SPIRIT: UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLICISM AND NATIONALISM
BETWEEN 1918 AND 1945
by
Hayden Proborowski
University of New Hampshire
Religious nationalism, defined as the integration of civic and religious identities, was a
popular vehicle for national struggle in eastern European countries like Poland and Romania
during the interwar period through Catholicism and Orthodoxy. While some countries experience
strong religious nationalist movements, others appear to be weaker. This research uses the case
study of the Ukrainian independence movement, which experienced attempts to meld the Greek
Catholic identity with nationalist causes between 1918 and 1945, to test which factors are
relevant in forming a religious nationalism. This research explores the ability and effectiveness
of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian nationalist groups, such as the
Organization for Ukrainian Nationalists, to bring about the synthesis of religious and political
aims and create a religio-national identity. Ultimately, Ukraine failed to foment religious
nationalism between 1918 and 1945 due to an inability to find successful cooperation between
religious institutions and nationalist groups. Debates regarding secular or Christian groundings of
the future Ukrainian state, the use of political violence and internal factionalism in both groups
prevented the formation of a clear religio-national identity in Ukraine. Successful repression of
the Ukrainian nationalist cause from occupying countries, such as Poland and the Soviet Union,
prevented the movement from engaging in explicit and intensive cross-cooperation, ultimately
failing when the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church dissolved in 1946. The failure to form a
resonating religio-national identity in Ukraine may be a relevant factor in the fractured political
landscape of the post-independence era, particularly during the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution.
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I. Introduction
Background
The tattered and fragmented formation of current Ukrainian nationalism, driven by a
disputed series of foundation myths and a highly heterogeneous population, invites a further
investigation. While many arguments regarding Ukrainian identity focus on political and ethnic
origins, a notable spiritual component is lacking: the role of religious institutions. Religious
institutions have historically intervened in the formation of nationalism, notably in the
foundation of the Polish Catholic identity. Ukrainian religious nationalism is an integral
component of identity-forming myth that is essential to achieving a well-rounded understanding
of the current state of the Ukrainian identity. The phenomena of religious nationalism can be
defined as the integration of national identities with a concurrent religious identity, thus inserting
a faith-based connotation to the struggle for independent state formation. The primary vehicle for
Ukrainian religious nationalism emerged through the Greek Catholic Church, popular in western
Ukraine in the early 20th century during the series of Austria, Polish, and Soviet occupations. The
destruction of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) in 1946, arranged at a meeting of
Soviet officials and religious figures in L’viv, ushered a forceful end to a troublesome vector of
anti-Communist resistance and Ukrainian national identity. Presently, Greek Catholics are only
8-10% of the Ukrainian population despite their historical role as an incubator of nationalism.1
The relevancy of the Greek Catholic’s role in harnessing Ukrainian religious nationalism is a
notable factor in measuring whether a true religio-national identity was created between 1918
and 1945.

1

“Europe – Ukraine”. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/up.html (accessed April 2, 2020).
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Religious nationalism becomes particularly relevant given a strong cooperation between
religious organizations and nationalist movements. The symbiosis between religious and
nationalist groups allows for a shared political goal that inherits both a faith-based and patriotic
struggle for existence. Juergensmeyer discusses multiple instances of religious nationalism such
as Jewish Zionism in Israel, Islamic theocracy in Iran, and the divide between Catholicism and
Protestantism in Northern Ireland.2 Barr uses the Malaysian case to discuss religious nationalism
in Asia: through a dual program of ethno-nationalism and religious adherence, Malaysia adopted
Islamization programs through education institutions to forge an Islamic-Malay identity.3 In
Japan, Indegaard and Fukase-Indegaard argues that the unity between traditional religions such
as Shintoism and the Meiji-era government allowed for an identity formation that supported the
emergent Japanese state’s distinctive identity from the West and establish a state religion that
lasted until the end of World War II.4 Toft and Zhukov observe the binary relationship between
Islam and self-determination in the Russian Caucuses, as the Chechnyan rebels utilize their
religious identification to justify a secession from the Russian state.5
Christianity often became the source of religious nationalism in eastern European states.
Loizides argues that the existence of autocephalous Orthodox churches in Bulgaria and Greece
contributed to a 19th-century nationalist revival in which an alliance between political and
religious institutions ascribed religious significance to ethnic and national existence.6 Guroian

2

Mark Juergensmeyer. "The global rise of religious nationalism." Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no.
3 (2010): 262-273.
3
Michael D. Barr, and Anantha Raman Govindasamy. "The Islamisation of Malaysia: Religious nationalism in the
service of ethnonationalism." Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 3 (2010): 293-311.
4
Fumiko Fukase-Indergaard and Michael Indergaard. "Religious nationalism and the making of the modern
Japanese state." Theory and Society 37, no. 4 (2008): 343-374.
5
Monica D. Toft, and Yuri M. Zhukov. "Islamists and nationalists: Rebel motivation and counterinsurgency in
Russia's North Caucasus." American Political Science Review 109, no. 2 (2015): 222-238.
6
Neophytos G. Loizides. "Religious nationalism and adaptation in Southeast Europe." Nationalities Papers 37, no.
2 (2009): 203-227.
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presents the association between the Armenian Orthodox Church and Armenian nationalist
groups through their twin formation of a national myth in the post-Soviet era.7 Johnston shows a
complementary conclusion in a survey of Lithuanian Catholicism, given the connection between
the church and Sajudis independence movement during the Soviet era: Lithuanian national
identity became realized through the vehicle of the Catholic Church.8 These examples, all
residing in formerly Soviet territory, are indicative of religious nationalism’s successful role
when given a mutual and cooperative existence between the church and nationalist groups.
The Ukrainian Question
To further investigate the interplay between religious institutions and nationalist groups
in the formation of religious nationalism, this research examines the case study of Ukraine
between 1918 and 1945. In particular, this research focuses on the relationship between UGCC
and Ukrainian nationalist groups in western Ukraine during this period. From 1918 to 1945,
Ukrainians fought an intense struggle against Poland and the Soviet Union in the fight for
national independence. This period contained the most forward outburst of nationalist energy in
Ukraine since the Cossack revolts of 1648. It reveals the foray of Ukrainian religious institutions
into political action toward the goal of national independence. Driven by an agitated nationalist
base and an activist Greek Catholic clergy, western Ukraine sought to become the Piedmont of a
Ukrainian Risorgimento: the leader that shapes the will of national unification. With the conquest
of Ukraine by the Soviet Union following the Second World War, the nationalist project for
independence dissipated.

7

Vigen Guroian. "Religion and Armenian national identity: Nationalism old and new." Occasional Papers on
Religion in Eastern Europe 14, no. 2 (1994): 3-9.
8
Hank Johnston. "Religion and nationalist subcultures in the Baltics." Journal of Baltic Studies 23, no. 2 (1992):
133-148.
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The selection of Ukraine is justified through its uniquely problematic formation of
national and religious identity. While neighboring states such as Romania9 and Poland10 formed
a readily visible religious nationalism during the interwar and postwar era, the potentiality for
Ukrainian religious nationalism remains an opaque and complex phenomenon. Ukraine’s
particularly impotent nationalist and religious response to Soviet occupation during the postwar
era (partially driven by strong Soviet repression), compared to the political energy of the Polish
Catholic Church and Solidarity movement, is an indicator of differences between the degree of
viability and sustenance of religious nationalism in the respective countries. Ukraine’s historical
problem of national identity formation is compounded by its multidenominational Christian
culture.11 Thus, examining the Ukrainian case study is worthwhile due to its ability to unveil the
potential obstacles that appear in the formation of religious nationalism.
Contribution
This research’s contribution is toward an understanding of if, and how, religious
nationalism formed in Ukraine between 1918 to 1945. By considering the degree of religious
nationalism in Ukraine during this period, it may be possible to identify a reason behind the
continued struggle for Ukrainian national identity during the 2010’s. The relationship between
UGCC and Ukrainian nationalist groups is vital in studying the interwar era of Ukrainian history
due to its complexity and importance as the dominant religious-political partnership of the
period. Analyzing the presence or absence of religious nationalism in interwar Ukraine is useful
for future comparative studies with neighboring countries such as Poland or Romania, which

9
Radu Ioanid, “The sacralized politics of the Romanian Iron Guard.” Totalitarian Movements and Political
Religions 5, no. 3 (2004): 419-453.
10
Genevieve Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2009).
11
Nikolai A. Kulinich, “Ukraine’s Russian Dilemma and Europe’s Evolving Geography.” In Ukraine: The search
for a national identity, edited by Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich (New York: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2000), 95-107.

4

assembled a definitive religio-national identity during the same era. This research also adds
understanding to the generalized aspects required for the formation of religious nationalism,
particularly in Christian contexts. With the discovery of the preconditions needed for religious
nationalism, future scholarship may focus on these certain aspects in other case studies.
Relevance
Ukraine’s multilayered identity formation in the postwar era under Soviet dominion is
puzzling given the unique national identities forged in neighboring Soviet-era states.12 The 2013
conflict in eastern Ukraine, emerging from the anti-Russian Euromaidan protest, signaled a
regional divide regarding the nature of national identity: while western Ukrainians championed
the continued propagation of independent and unified nationhood, eastern Ukrainians typically
sought revanchism and realignment with its large ethnic Russian population (which was
supplemented through Russian-sponsored population relocations to Ukraine). Supported by a
Russian desire to protect their ethnic diaspora in Ukraine, the conflict began through a potential
push to expand Russia’s sphere of influence and territory against an emergent pro-European
Union segment in western Ukraine13. While the events of the War in Donbass occurred almost a
century after the interwar struggles for Ukrainian independence, the period from 1918 to 1945
formed a contextualization for regional and religious divides regarding the ethnic and national
status of Ukraine. The support shown by UGCC for national independence in the immediate
post-Soviet years, contrasted by the fragmented response of Orthodoxy to continued Russian
relationships, is indicative of an extant religious tinge to understandings of Ukrainianism.14 By

12

Karina V. Korostelina. "Mapping national identity narratives in Ukraine." Nationalities Papers 41, no. 2 (2013):
296-300.
13
For more information, visit https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia
14
Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990s. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 86-90.
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tracing the religious and national divide to the interwar and World War II-era, this research
examines the origins of the embattled Ukrainian identity in the present day.
II. Literature Review
Toward a Sociological Explanation
Social identity theory, originating in sociological scholarship, asserts that religion and
nationalism are expressive of humanity’s desire for grouping to ensure physical and
psychological security, relying on social categorization for effectiveness. Beginning with the
works of Tajfel, social identity theory states that groups are used to provide categorization to
ensure self-security in a turbulent and uncertain world. Groups allow for uniformity of action
between members and provide in-group bias formation to reward members and discriminate
against outsiders. Individuals will internalize the group as their self-concept, connecting with
other individuals with similar self-references to ensure solidarity and a group-based response to
outside threats. Religious and nationalist groups are therefore examples of humanity’s socially
rational response in providing self-security, moral boundary formation, and receiving social
benefits prescribed within a certain group.15 Ysseldyk et al. adopts Tajfel’s social identity theory,
arguing specifically that religious groups allow for closer bonding than civic groups due to the
identification with eternal purpose, meaning, and philosophical pillars. Ysseldyk et al. claim that
religious fundamentalists, utilizing discrimination and high-level ingroup rewarding, can
combine claims of spiritual authority and morality with ethnic and nationalist considerations,
fusing together a highly selective and powerful social group. Religious groups tend to unite to
threats to group identity, intensifying social categorization to achieve greater group solidity.16

15

Henri Tajfel. "Social identity and intergroup behaviour." Information (International Social Science Council) 13,
no. 2 (1974): 65-93.
16
Renate Ysseldyk, Kimberly Matheson, and Hymie Anisman. "Religiosity as identity: Toward an understanding of
religion from a social identity perspective." Personality and Social Psychology Review 14, no. 1 (2010): 60-71.
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Tajfel’s influence is evident in the work of Seul, who describes religious groups as a tool
for belonging and predictability of thought while reducing uncertainty and instability. Seul
remarks that religion provides a collective purpose and a shared set of values and history.
However, religion can be a motivator for intergroup conflict, given its intractable nature and
ability to mobilize members to conduct effective collective action and violence. Seul states that
religion is an “anchor” that sets self-identity into a worldview consistent with shared
mythological or ritualistic considerations.17 Thus, religion is useful for rooting oneself in
institutional membership to achieve self-security and actualization of worldviews and can be
used for potentially violent means to achieve solidity and proliferation of values.
Religion as an “anchor”, utilized in Seul’s work, is a concept particularly useful in
Furrow et al.’s argument that religion is a cornerstone of individual and group development.
Despite focusing on youth development, the authors’ research is consistent with emergent group
identification. Religion’s most potent force is shaping belief and moral codes within the group,
providing cohesiveness and becoming the cornerstone of community development. Cooperation
is expected as members seek similar group answers and spiritual connections through
interactional boundaries expressed by the religion. Value creation and further development, both
individually and within the group, is dependent on the “anchor” that the religion provides.18
Oppong notes that religion becomes central to one’s personality and allows for unity of social
circumstance within groups, allowing value acculturation to indicate group membership and

17

Jeffrey R. Seul. "Ours is the way of god': Religion, identity, and intergroup conflict." Journal of peace research
36, no. 5 (1999): 553-569.
18
James L. Furrow, Pamela Ebstyne King, and Krystal White. "Religion and positive youth development: Identity,
meaning, and prosocial concerns." Applied Developmental Science 8, no. 1 (2004): 17-26.
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assimilation. Religion becomes a value-based mechanism for identity formation in the author’s
related conclusions.19
Expanding upon Furrow et al. and Seul’s proclamations of religion as an anchor,
Kinnvall pinpoints periods of uncertainty as religion’s source of cohesion and identification as
members seek to mitigate turmoil by attaching themselves to religious communities. Kinvall
denotes religion as a “thick signifier” that allows community protection from insecure periods,
such as foreign occupation and domestic turmoil. Believing identities are socially constructed,
Kinnvall notes that groups tend to maximize similarities to achieve emotional unification.
Groups thus form “we-images” that abhor strangers, dehumanize outsiders, and surround
members with a sanctified privilege. Kinnvall argues that groups often mythologize historical
traumas or glories to reinforce cohesion, kindred to the growth of national identity.20 Hogg et al.
concur with Kinnvall’s adoption of uncertainty-identity theory, arguing that religion provides
group security for members to empower collective identification and allow for internal
stereotyping to achieve a standard set of norms and values. Religion establishes normative
practices and reduces existential uncertainty, given the promise of a definitive afterlife. Like
others, Hogg et al. believes religion is a useful anchor during uncertain times by giving a
structured and strong collective identity. Bonding occurs within the community due to the
rigidity and impermeability of religious worldviews.21 The arguments given by Hogg et al. and
Kinnvall invoke rational action, as the authors believe individuals choose to construct groupbased identities during uncertain periods to reduce their individual existential insecurity. Hogg et

19

Steward H. Oppong. "Religion and identity." American International Journal of Contemporary Research 3, no. 6
(2013): 10-16.
20
Catarina Kinnvall. "Globalization and religious nationalism: Self, identity, and the search for ontological
security." Political psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 741-767.
21
Michael A. Hogg, Janice R. Adelman, and Robert D. Blagg. "Religion in the face of uncertainty: An uncertaintyidentity theory account of religiousness." Personality and social psychology review 14, no. 1 (2010): 72-83.

8

al.’s arguments imply that religion could possess a role in crafting national identity following
independence, given the uncertainty and typical weakness of initial post-independence
governance.
Within the uncertainty-identity theory lies Sheikh’s argument that sacred values form
within religious groups, transitioning secular and temporal issues into religious issues, during
such tumultuous periods. When under a great threat, religious groups can “religionalize” political
issues due to their strength as a group identity, attaching religious connotations to otherwise nonspiritual matters. With this, religious groups become active within the political realm to defend
sacred values and advocate for their interests. Certain political issues, such as independence and
self-determination, can become imbued with religious symbolism as it becomes a sacred value.
Sheikh’s argument helps explain the linkage between religious belief and political activism.22
Through the lens of social identity theory, one can next examine the phenomena of religious
nationalism in the Enlightenment era.
Religious Nationalism
Religious nationalism relies upon shared faith, customs, nationhood, and values within a
group. Hobsbawm’s analysis of “tradition” reveals the tendency to invent, reshape, or realign
historical communal values to fit upon a modern standard within such groups. Through this
connection to a perceived shared history, groups may connect their practices and conventions,
imposed by repetition, to an ancestral origin. The use of invented traditions is found in their
ability to enforce social cohesion, legitimize institutions, and allow value socialization to
supplement group identity.23 Anderson emphasizes the use of propaganda and literature that

22

Hammad Sheikh, Jeremy Ginges, Alin Coman, and Scott Atran. "Religion, group threat and sacred values."
Judgment and Decision Making 7, no. 2 (2012): 110-118.
23
Eric J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger. The Invention of tradition. Cambridge University Press, 1983.

9

allow for myths and traditions to proliferate throughout certain communities, thus allowing for
groups to gain membership and solidify a shared identity through contact with such myths.
Nationalism typically begins, in Anderson’s understanding, through the impersonal spread of
group-images of fellow countrymen through identification with a common origin, culture, and
value system.24 The shared myth and tradition are essential for the sprouting of religious
nationalism.
Brubaker expands upon this basis by identifying the three main outcomes of nationalist
thought. Firstly, a group receives a common identifier through a shared name and organization.
Social organizations are created through the construction of institutional systems, which offer
moral and cultural templates for followers to adopt. Lastly, framing events with preconceived
worldviews and specifications allows for the politicization of certain occurrences. The usage of
religion by a nationalist group strengthens these bonds and outcomes by tying ideas of destiny,
morality, and finality to their action.25 Friedland builds notes that religious nationalism turns
political action into a religious obligation, providing notions of immediacy and conclusively to
group activity. Institutions become blended, as religious groups begin to accumulate power
within political contexts.26 This recipe allows for religious-imbued nationalism through group
cohesivity and feelings of shared destiny.
To understand the growth of religious nationalism, Rieffer expands these concepts by
discussing the conditions that allow for the occurrence of religious nationalism. Formation only
occurs when there is homogeneity of religion within the group population, a connection to a

24
Benedict Anderson. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. Verso books,
2006.
25
Rogers Brubaker. "Religion and nationalism: Four approaches." Nations and nationalism 18, no. 1 (2012): 2-20.
26
Roger Friedland. "Religious nationalism and the problem of collective representation." Annual Review of
Sociology 27, no. 1 (2001): 125-152.
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physical location such as land or territory, a need to protect from threats to either the religion or
country, and the required formation of a group identity to counteract the presence of other
nationalist organizations that threaten the structure or lifestyle of the group.27 Spohn notes that
religious nationalism tends to occur as a reaction to encroaching secularism within a state or
culture, finding particular potency if such secularism disrupts the existence of a traditionally and
predominately religious society. Spohn states that religious nationalism is a transitory phase
during the process of state formation and nation-building, in which civil identities attempt to
overpower religious identities.28 The struggle between secularism and religion in a traditional
society causes groups to embrace their religious heritage to block the erosion of their spiritual
bonds.
In conjunction with social identity theory, Friedland advocates for an institutional
analysis that evaluates the conditions that enable religious nationalists to engage in social and
political action. Friedland shows that religious nationalism assimilates into the institutional
capacities of the state, thus causing the state to act in accordance to the religious and social
narratives pursued by the nationalist group. Religious nationalists may bond to their secular
political counterparts by incorporating religious narratives, morality formation, and assigning a
level of sacredness to the existence of the state.29 Thus, Mihelj concludes that secular and
religious nationalism may align toward a compatible goal by intertwining their respective myths
and symbols to serve a common purpose. This alliance may only occur if both types of

27

Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer. "Religion and nationalism: Understanding the consequences of a complex relationship."
Ethnicities 3, no. 2 (2003): 215-242.
28
Willfried Spohn. "Multiple modernity, nationalism and religion: a global perspective." Current sociology 51, no.
3-4 (2003): 265-286.
29
Roger Friedland. "When God walks in history: the institutional politics of religious nationalism." International
Sociology 14, no. 3 (1999): 301-319.
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nationalism can reconcile any spiritual or political differences, as they tend to be exclusionary
forms of expression.30
The melding of religious nationalism toward secular goals is characterized by Johnston as
a “religio-oppositional subculture”. Opposition groups, using the strong signifier of religion as a
unifying tool, blossom under repressive regimes. These groups tie religious symbolism with
dissident politics, aimed at attacking occupational governments and tending toward a goal of
state secession. Johnson describes the usage of Catholic symbolism in the Polish independence
movement during the Soviet era. To achieve a socialized community of dissidents, the religiooppositional subculture permeates throughout familial relations and educational institutions to
create organic organizational structures, leadership training, and resources that allow for a
continuous and growing stream of recruits.31 Johnston adds that religio-nationalist subcultures
emerge under conditions by which religious institutions are granted special privileges outside the
purview of the state, have a historic bind to an ethnic or patriotic group, and can offer the
institutional protections that allow such movements to avoid direct initial repression.32 Factors
such as state restrictions on religious institutions or the degree in which a religious institution is
cooperative with the associated regime can diminish the effectiveness of religio-nationalist
subcultures.
Ethno-symbolist theorists believe that dualistic religious and ethnic identities are
strongest and allow for the formation of a national destiny of kindred peoples, furthering a forged
identity. Smith defines ethno-symbolism as “cultural and symbolic elements of ethnicity in terms

30

Sabina Mihelj. "‘Faith in nation comes in different guises’: modernist versions of religious nationalism." Nations
and nationalism 13, no. 2 (2007): 265-284.
31
Hank Johnston. "Toward an explanation of Church opposition to authoritarian regimes: religio-oppositional
subcultures in Poland and Catalonia." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (1989): 493-508.
32
Hank Johnston. "Religio-nationalist subcultures under the communists: Comparisons from the Baltics,
Transcaucasia and Ukraine." Sociology of Religion 54, no. 3 (1993): 237-255.
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of its components of myth, memory, symbol, value, and tradition”.33 Ethnic groups combine their
identity with religious beliefs, crafting a woven common history and moral framework that are
propagated throughout the community. Such an identification will often fuse national identity
with religious convictions, forming a powerful community force that binds ethnic group
members politically. Cauthen argues that the unification of a certain religion with an ethnic
group allows for the “myth of the elect” to form, in which the group perceives itself as preordained for a destiny and collective purpose. This is typically unified with national identity,
seeking to further the group’s cultural survival and continuity through a unified spirit and
temporal agent of a state. The group may seek to defend or reclaim a perceived sacred homeland,
which is the geographic center of the ethno-symbolic dogma.34 Cultural groups can be imbued
with a sense of collective purpose, particularly nationalism, given the presence of a spiritual
bond.
Ethno-symbolic theorists both approve and challenge Cauthen’s claims. Leustean furthers
Cauthen’s argument by claiming that an eternal relationship exists between religious institutions
and nations, even if the nation is secular. While Cauthen relies on ethnic bonds, Leustean
believes myths and symbols can unify spiritual and temporal institutions solely. Religion
provides the behavioral framework for the nation by granting a societal vision and participatory
role for its peoples. Ethno-symbolic nationalism is a joint program between nation and church to
bind a common ancestry, community, and faith together.35 Both nation and faith can jointly use
similar myths and symbols, crafting an everyday reality influenced by religious values.

33

Anthony Smith. “Ethnosymbolism.” In The Wiley Blackwell encyclopedia of race, ethnicity, and nationalism,
edited by John Stone, Rutledge M. Dennis, Polly Rizova, Anthony Smith, and Xiaoshuo Hou (Wiley Blackwell,
2016), 784-785.
34
Bruce Cauthen. "Covenant and continuity: ethno‐symbolism and the myth of divine election." Nations and
nationalism 10, no. 1‐2 (2004): 19-33.
35
Lucian Leustean. "Towards an integrative theory of religion and politics." Method & Theory in the Study of
Religion 17, no. 4 (2005): 364-381.

13

However, Safran challenges both Cauthen and Leustean by stating that language, rather than
religion, forges with ethnic identity to form a national destiny for peoples. Safran argues that
religion is an initial unifier of ethnic groups, and previously crafted proto-national identities
during the medieval era. Post-Renaissance humanist thought disavowed spiritual unification,
focusing on language as a signifier of common peoples across religious faiths. Noting the role of
the printing press as a spreader of common languages, thus formulating national identities and
eventually rallying unification efforts in several countries, Safran concludes that language is the
foundation of national bonds in the civic-minded world.36 Agreeing on the unifying nature of
religion for culturally similar peoples, Safran and Cauthen diverge in religion’s capacity for
nation-state formation.
Disruption in the fusion of religious and national identities is described by Gentile as the
byproduct of the political realm manifesting a civic religiosity that conflicts with traditional
religiosity. Civic religions are a “metamorphosis of the sacred” toward the elevation of the state
as the primary form of faithfulness and consecration. Nationalism’s use of ritual, symbolism, and
dogmas replaces traditional religiosity as a new type of sacred mobilization. Gentile
acknowledges that nationalism’s desire for actualized sovereignty lends sanctity to the state and
attaches a divinity to martyrs that act toward the reification of the state. The “cult of the nation”
overcomes traditional religiosity by creating moral and civic unity within nationalist
organizations. Thus, Gentile ascribes nationalist movements as “political religions”.37
Political and traditional religions tend toward conflicts, even if both pursue the same goal
of nationhood. Gentile describes the attributes of a political religion: the placement of the

36

William Safran. "Language, ethnicity and religion: a complex and persistent linkage." Nations and Nationalism
14, no. 1 (2008): 171-190.
37
Emilio Gentile. Politics as religion. (Princeton University Press, 2006).
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creation of a state above all religious considerations; a “code of commandments” that attaches
ethical and moral law to the formation of the state; the community identifier of destiny within a
body of common national identity; and a “political liturgy” which attaches divine revelation to
the actions and goals of the nationalist movement. Traditional religion typically views political
religions as competitors, seeking to divert people away from godly worship to a material and
secular end. The religification of the state redirects the community toward humanistic goals that
contend with the spiritual aspirations of the church. Gentile illustrates that nationalist groups,
once in power, will intervene in educational institutions by polemizing secular concepts such as
state and ethnicity away from the traditional religion’s curriculum. The deified state will require
the church to become apolitical or will use religious institutions as forms of state control. Gentile
characterizes this relationship through the dilution of the traditional religion’s principles with a
syncretic and shared existence alongside the political religion. However, crisis occurs within the
relationship if the traditional religion refuses to cooperate with the goals of the nationalist
movement, thus making the partnership impotent.38 Religious nationalism relies upon the
continued collaboration of both the political and traditional religion.
Institutional Cooperation
Institutional theorists claim that religious institutions shape political norms by framing
morality, identity, and policy, thus crafting a symbiotic institutional relationship. Fox argues that
religious institutions are of increasing importance as individuals embrace faith to counter
alienation and disorientation from times of economic or political displacement, which tends to
disrupt local cultures and practices. Through this, religion gains greater strength in policymaking
as individuals and cultures maximize their faith, allowing for religious institutions to weave such
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values into the temporal government. This pushes government decisionmakers to morally craft
their policy decisions through religious identification, dually legitimizing themselves to the
people through an attachment to a religious institution.39 Giannakos concurs with Fox, arguing
that states tend to use religious beliefs for value and law formation. In return, churches
subordinate to the state to not interfere in domestic matters or rival the state for control. This
mutually dependent relationship allows the church to cater to the state’s needs while the state
respects the influence of the church on the population. There is an institutional, rather than
identity-based, partnership between the powers. Identity between the church and state is blended
rather than separate. Giannakos utilizes evidence from southeastern Europe, discussing the usage
of autocephalous Orthodox churches as rallying points for political independence and national
identity movements in Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. Such institutions consolidate independence
movements by uniting political and religious passions.40 Both authors note that church and state
institutions hold dualistic influence, shaping the actions of each other.
Kunovich echoes Fox and Giannakos, establishing that religion typically overlaps with
national identity to influence institutional discourse and value formation. The author notes the
intertwining identities perpetuated by interwar Italian fascists, combining heritage with Catholic
faith. The crafting of a dualistic nation-faith identity allows for ready group mobilization,
providing solidarity across spiritual and temporal lines. Religious institutions are useful in
gathering resources and supplying leadership for nationalist movements to succeed. By
combining the dominant religious group with a nationalist discourse, a greater group security
status can be achieved as religious worshippers become united to the efforts to the state.

39

Jonathan Fox. "Religion as an overlooked element of international relations." International Studies Review 3, no.
3 (2001): 53-73.
40
Symeon Giannakos. "Church and State." Harvard International Review 25, no. 4 (2004): 52-57.

16

Institutionalists conclude that religious institutions hold tremendous sway over value and moral
formations in political governance, thus influencing policymaking.41 Contrary to social identity
theory, institutional theorists believe that religion has a structural influence rather than emanating
from a purely individualistic and rational origin.
III. Research Plan
Research Question
The interwar era in Ukrainian history contained complex obstacles that constrained the
ability of nationalists to achieve their goal of statehood. Primarily partitioned between Polish and
Soviet control, Ukraine was a stateless entity during an era of self-determination and national
revivals. Questions of ethnic and religious identities haunted the Ukrainian question, given the
late emergence of the Ukrainian identity and lack of a unified definition. The boundaries of the
future Ukrainian state, as defined by nationalists, held numerous ethnic minorities that contained
Russophilic or pan-Slavic elements. The religious split between the Greek Catholics in western
Ukraine and Orthodox-centric faiths in eastern Ukraine remained a sectarian issue that
influenced political realities and identity formation across the proposed Ukrainian nation.
Despite these challenges, Ukrainian nationalists were compelled to fuse the religious identities of
their peoples within the framework of national realization. This research examines the interplay
between Ukrainian nationalist groups with the Greek Catholic Church, which was the bastion of
Ukrainian national identity during the prewar era. The following question is explored: what
effect did the relationship between UGCC and nationalist groups have on the development of
religio-nationalism in Ukraine from 1918 to 1945? From an analysis of this question, it will be
possible to weigh the resonance of religious nationalism in Ukraine.
41
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Hypothesis
If religious institutions and nationalist groups can synthesize spiritual and political
institutional goals, then religio-nationalism can form.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this hypothesis is religio-nationalism. Religio-nationalism is
defined as the integration of national identities with a concurrent religious identity, thus inserting
a faith-based connotation to the struggle for independent state formation. While religionationalism cannot be quantitatively defined, it can be gauged through the usage of religious
symbols and spirit in various nationalist literature and platforms. Religio-nationalism may also
involve the active role of religious institutions in supporting nationalist groups, whether through
political or material backing. The presence, or lack thereof, of a dualism between religion and
national identity determines the formation of religio-nationalism.
This research focuses on the relationship between the Greek Catholic Church and
Ukrainian nationalists during the interwar era. The degree in which a religio-national identity
was achieved during the interwar years is gauged qualitatively through the level of cooperation
between the Church and Ukrainian nationalists. While the cooperation between the groups
evolved during the interwar era, analysis of formative political events is used to determine the
periods that best exemplify the progression of the Greek Catholic and Ukrainian nationalist
relationship. It is important to note that some relationships may have remained private, and that
disparate elements of each group may have rebuffed the public relationship between the Church
and nationalists. Therefore, this relationship is not wholly monolithic, but is subject to the
dominant narratives present. Additionally, it is possible that diasporic members of the Church
were not accurately represented in the views of UGCC leadership.
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Independent Variable
The independent variable in this relationship is the synthesis of religious and nationalist
institutional goals in both the political and spiritual realm. This explores the degree of likeness
granted to the ultimate goals of each group, which is used to judge the level of institutional
cooperation. A high level of institutional synthesis is evident when both religious and nationalist
groups subscribe to the same political and spiritual aims; for example, in areas such as
nationhood and religious policy. This may also be evident if both groups sanction certain
political activities and remain united in their responses to certain direct action undertaken by
nationalists in the struggle for independence. A low level of institutional synthesis is reached
when religious and nationalist groups cannot coalesce around the goal of nationhood or disavow
the actions of their respective institutional partner. To judge this, the statements, reactions, and
political activities of the Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian nationalists are evaluated for
similarities in policy responses or action. The degree with which both institutions achieve
likeness in political action determine the synthesis of their spiritual and political aims.
Case Study
This research uses the case study of the relationship between UGCC and Ukrainian
nationalists during the period of 1918 to 1945. Evidence from World War II-era actions is used
to evaluate the effects of the relationship toward the goal of Ukrainian independence. Ukraine
offers a unique example for the study of religio-nationalism due to the degree of political activity
undertaken by the Greek Catholic Church in the pursuit of independence. The Greek Catholic
Church is one of the few Eastern Catholic-rite churches operational within interwar eastern
Europe, contrasted with the ubiquity of Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and Protestant
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denominations in other eastern Europe states. Therefore, the political viability of an Eastern
Catholic religio-nationalism identity can be assessed.
Ukrainian nationalist groups present a curious case in eastern European national identity
formation, given their challenge to bridge the multiethnic and pluralistic identities of the
Ukrainians. The stateless peoples of Ukraine, divided primarily between Poland and the Soviet
Union, provided a transnational foundation for the nationalist movement. Other nationalist
organizations such as the Iron Guard in Romania had the convenience of an extant state and a
mono-religious Orthodox citizenry to provide the foundations for a religio-national identity.
Poland’s existing Catholic religio-national identity helped form the foundations for the Solidarity
protest movement in the Soviet era. The question of religio-national identity in Ukraine helps
explain the construction of the Ukrainian identity during their attempt at interwar independence,
forming the basis for religion’s role within the postwar Ukrainian ethos.
IV. Case Study
Introduction
National identity in postwar Ukraine, repressed by the Soviet Union and lacking any
meaningful connection to legitimate religious institutions, can best be explained through a focus
on the immediate post-World War I landscape. Ukraine’s division between Polish and Soviet
rule in the interwar era incited an attempt at transnational unification within such spheres of
influence. These efforts at nation-building, plagued by the lack of a normalized Ukrainian
identity and the mosaic of political organizations with conflicting beliefs, failed to materialize an
independent Ukrainian state. Despite the popularity of nationalistic self-determination
movements in the post-World War I political landscape, resulting from the collapse and
realignment of the Austro-Hungarians and German Reich, Ukrainians were not able to establish
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an independent state. This research examines the relationship between the Greek Catholic
Church and Ukrainian nationalist groups toward the goal of Ukrainian statehood during the
interwar period. Investigating the organizational symbiosis of these groups within Ukraine
allows for an understanding of the failure of Ukrainian nationalism to succeed in the interwar
period.
The institutional roots of Ukrainian Christianity began in 988 with the Baptism of Kiev
by Prince Volodymyr. With support from the patriarch of Constantinople, Volodymyr introduced
Orthodoxy as the primary state religion of the Kievan Rus’. The Baptism of Kiev initiated the
spread of Orthodoxy, oppositional to the Roman Catholicism which had absorbed the
neighboring Polish kingdom, as the dominant religion of the Slavic peoples. The decline of the
Kievan Rus’ in the 13th century, primarily due to economic factors and the Mongol invasion,
resulted in the transition of territorial authority to the rule of Polish and Lithuanian nobility.
Polonization imbued the Kievan people with linguistic and cultural education that led to the
growing attraction and acceptance of Polish rule by the subjects of Rus’. The Polonization
process led to an increase in Catholicism throughout Volodymyr’s former lands, particularly in
areas of western Ukraine that bordered closely to the heart of the Polish kingdom.42 This era,
marked by the rising influence of Polish Catholicism and the deterioration of Orthodox political
and cultural power in Ukraine, created the circumstances to allow the growth of the hybrid Greek
Catholic religion to flourish in eastern European lands.
The process of Christianization in Ukraine allowed the Greek Catholic Church to emerge
from the religious landscape following theological disputes. Ecumenical desires in eastern
Europe between Catholicism and Orthodoxy led to the Union of Brest in 1596. The union
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intended to fuse the denominations into a singular Christian identity under papal authority, while
preserving Orthodox liturgy and rites. It received political support from Polish King Sigismund
III due to its potentiality to pull Ukraine further into his country’s Catholic orbit. Orthodox
nobility, particularly in eastern Ukraine, fought against the union and disrupted the ecumenical
process, thus ending the prospects of Brest. Despite the victory of anti-union clergy, laity that
remained pro-union (mostly in western Ukraine) sought the creation of a new Christian
institution.43 The Greek Catholics, splintered from their Orthodox origins, forged a new religious
identity.
During the 17th and 18th centuries, western Ukraine remained under the control of the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Orthodox-centric Cossack Revolt (1648) failed to create
an independent Ukrainian polity separate from Polish-Lithuanian rule; following the
unsuccessful Revolt, many Orthodox churches in western Ukraine converted to Greek
Catholicism. Meanwhile, eastern Ukraine gradually fell under the power of Muscovy, reaching
the Peresiaslav Agreement (1654) and Eternal Peace (1686) to cede sovereignty as a counter to
encroaching Polish-Lithuanian power. Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s realignment to the Moscow
patriarchate in 1686 caused a decrease in its institutional power in western Ukraine as the
Polonized Ukrainian elite adopted Greek Catholicism. Greek Catholicism’s unique combination
of Roman loyalty and retainment of Orthodox practices blended into the western Ukrainian, and
particularly Galician, culture. Much of western Ukraine’s Orthodox leadership migrated to the
east, while Orthodox organizations such as the Stauropegial Brotherhood reformed to Greek
Catholicism. 44 Western Ukraine solidified as a Greek Catholic stronghold as Orthodoxy
weakened.
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Austria’s partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 ceded western
Ukraine to the Catholic Habsburg rulers, creating the environment in which Ukrainian
nationalism emerged. Initially, the Greek Catholics were treated as inferior subjects within
Austria due to the religion’s popularity among Ukrainian serfs and absence of a trained clergy.
However, the reigns of Empress Maria Theresa and Joseph II established the conditions for
Ukrainian nationalism to emerge in Galicia. First, Maria Theresa granted Greek Catholicism
equal protections similar to Roman Catholicism in 1774. Joseph II initiated educational
investment projects for Galicia, creating seminaries and academies to train Greek Catholic
priests. The metropolitan see in Galicia was established in 1808, granting prestige to the Greek
Catholic religion.45 From these projects, a uniquely Ukrainian and Greek Catholic intelligentsia
emerged that would propagate the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism in the coming decades. These
groups would, in the coming decades, be influential in the formation of explicit political
representation for ethnic Ukrainians following the 1848 revolution.
The 1848 revolution in Austria allowed Ukrainians, and the Greek Catholic Church, to
became politically conscious and active throughout Galicia. The wave of democratic agitation
throughout Habsburg lands resulted in the creation of the Supreme Ruthenian Council by Greek
Catholic clergymen in 1848, which became the chief body for Ukrainian political activity. The
Supreme Ruthenian Council was composed of thirty members selected from UGCC and the
Ukrainian intelligentsia milieu. Ukrainians also gained a larger allotment of seats in the Austrian
Reichstag. The newly educated Greek Catholic clergy engaged in political activism, lobbying for
Ukrainian language education in Galicia. The presence of Poles in Galicia became a target for
the Supreme Ruthenian Council, which rejected the diffusion of Polish cultural and religious
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ideals among Ukrainians. The Greek Catholic clergy was explicitly anti-Polish, forging a
particular identity in opposition to Poles: the Ukrainian national idea.46 The Habsburgs supported
the Supreme Ruthenian Council’s attempts to de-Polonize Galicia, desiring a strong
counterweight to growing Polish unrest in the province.47 Importantly, the Slavic Congress of
1848 recognized Ukrainians as a nationality.48 Ukrainian Greek Catholics began to internalize
emergent ideas of ethnic and cultural uniqueness as their political power within Austria increased
and the threat of Polish cultural displacement grew.
UGCC became the primary distributor and curator of the Ukrainian national idea in the
post-1848 political landscape. UGCC was the prime vehicle for educational activism for
Ukrainianization in Galicia, integrating into local community levels through service projects and
groups.49 Cultural societies and newspapers supported by UGCC proliferated such national ideas
to urban areas and the educated populace.50 A stress on Ukrainian language education and the
growth of Ukrainian-language publications crafted a linguistic-based nationalism among
Galicians.51 The sons of UGCC priests formed the main figures of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, as
the church sought to spread their national ideals beyond religious communities into secular areas.
However, the attempt of UGCC to reach Galician peasants stunted the growth of the Ukrainian
ideal. Despite UGCC’s attempts to acculturate a Ukrainian identity among peasants, economic
resentment overruled ideas of ethnic and cultural unity. Galician peasants did not typically
engage in political action alongside the clergy due to class distinctions and economic disparity.
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The persistence of Orthodoxy in the countryside and Russophile ideas prevented the Ukrainian
identity from being fully realized.52 Ukrainian nationalism, advocated by religious figures and
intelligentsia, remained a chiefly urban phenomenon.
However, secular segments of the Ukrainian intelligentsia replaced UGCC as the main
proprietors of nationalism in the late 19th century. The socialist Ukrainian Radical Party, created
in 1890, became the primary advocates for pan-Ukrainianism. Ukrainian students were the
bulwark against Polish influence in institutions such as the University of L’viv. 53 Secular leaders
found appeal among Ukrainians that religious figures could not achieve; instead, Ukrainian
nationalism achieved an anticlerical and atheist flavor in the 1890’s due to secular antipathy
directed at the church. UGCC, despite being the motivator for Ukrainian nationalism, fell to a
newly secular and socialist aspect in Galicia.
The Greek Catholic Church in Interwar Ukraine
This section argues that UGCC’s support of Christian patriotism and evangelical
nationalism caused the lack of commonality with relevant Ukrainian nationalist organizations,
inhibiting any synthesis of political aims in the interwar period. Andrey Sheptytsky’s ascension
to UGCC leadership allowed the church to become a politically relevant player in Ukrainian
nationalist circles. UGCC’s role in the 19th century as a nexus for ethno-genesis formation
transformed by the advent of the 20th century into the religious advocate for statehood. However,
UGCC’s inability to consolidate internal consistency around statehood aims and a conflicting
relationship for primacy within the nationalist movement dissuaded any religio-national
unification.
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The failure of UGCC to direct the national movement in the 1890’s was rectified by the
new leadership of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, serving from 1900 to 1944. Sheptytsky
acknowledged the heritage of UGCC as a political vehicle for Ukrainian nationalism, choosing to
use his position of Metropolitan to engage in political activism. Due to the multitude of national
identifications and religious affiliates in Ukraine, Sheptytsky avoided the transformation of
UGCC into a fully political organization to maintain a universalist stance toward his
ideologically diverse laity and clergy. UGCC pursued an aspirational ecumenism with Ukrainian
Orthodoxy, seeking to maintain a strong relationship without explicitly forming a national
church. Sheptytsky believed a bond between UGCC and Ukrainian Orthodoxy could form a
coherent national identity that disregarded confessional divides.54 However, Sheptytsky’s
ecumenicism failed to emerge given Orthodoxy’s internal fragmentation between patriarchates in
eastern Ukraine. Sheptytsky could not propogate UGCC throughout eastern Ukraine, given the
geographical attachment of the Greek Catholics to Galicia and Orthodox suspicion of the spread
of the faith. Lacking any eastern appeal, UGCC did not formulate a unified religious identity for
Ukrainians.55 Religious identity divisions harmed Sheptytsky’s political allure in the east.
World War I and the subsequent Ukrainian War of Independence, which plagued Ukraine
with violence from 1914 to 1921, resulted in a strategic transformation of the political program
of UGCC. During World War I, the Russian invasion of Austria resulted in a temporary
occupation of Galician Ukraine. Ukraine, fighting in support of Austria against Russia, received
punishment under their new sovereigns: Russian banned UGCC and dismantled its public
operations in 1915 until Russia’s withdrawal from Austria in 1917. Following the chaotic
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Ukrainian War of Independence and Bolshevik invasion, which divided Ukrainian territory
between Poland and the Soviet Union at the Treaty of Riga (1921), UGCC recalibrated to
confront the new political environment.56 Sheptytsky’s political efforts, which originally sought
greater Ukrainian autonomy in Austria, now encountered the new rule of Poland. As western
Ukraine fell to Poland at Riga, Sheptytsky adopted “Christian patriotism” with the explicit
intention to achieve Ukrainian independence. The threat of Bolshevik Russia in eastern Ukraine
caused UGCC to adopt a staunchly anti-Communist stance.57 Sheptytsky and UGCC, beyond
their initial pursuit of a uniform Ukrainian identity, now became advocates for statehood.58
The Christian patriotism of Sheptytsky’s UGCC, in the pursuit of Ukrainian secession
from Polish rule, achieved a distinct character. Sheptytsky advocated for evangelical rather than
political nationalism, hoping to engage with nationalism through religious means rather than
through electoral processes or political action. Political violence was explicitly disavowed due to
UGCC’s desire to use religion as a method for nationalism.59 Christian patriots in UGCC denied
forms of violence or terrorism against Polish authorities as effective methods of gaining
popularity or growing Ukrainian political consciousness. Sheptytsky advocated for ethnic and
religious tolerance within Ukrainian nationalism, believing that Orthodoxy and Russian elements
within Ukraine could be allowed to operate in the movement. UGCC sought to proselytize
nationalism in eastern Ukraine to create a transnational religious movement toward the formation
of an independent state.60 Greek Catholic clergy members such as Avhustyn Voloshyn
combatted Russophilic elements in the Transcarpathia and Bukovyna regions, showing UGCC’s
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intent for inclusion amongst Ukrainian identities in the fight for statehood.61 Through this
character of Christian patriotism, UGCC engaged in political activities against Polish occupation.
Possessing the cultural capital to sway the course of Ukrainian nationalism, UGCC cast
the struggle against Poland as a peaceful endeavor. UGCC condemned all forms of terrorism
against the Poles, as Sheptytsky urged his supporters to engage through a purely political
process. With Vatican condemnation of the looming Communist threat, particularly referenced in
Pope Pius XI’s Divini Redemptoris of 1937,62 Sheptytsky cast a more forgiving attitude to fellow
Catholic Poles than atheistic Russians. However, this idealistic condemnation did not spread
beyond verbiage; in the course of five months during 1930, thirty clerics were arrested on
terrorism charges. UGCC began to openly cooperate with nationalist groups, such as the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). OUN, which pursued methods of direct action to
combat Polish occupation, were responsible for many high-profile terror attacks against Polish
government officials. Sheptytsky’s creation of the Ukrainian Catholic Union in 1931, a political
organization meant to became a religiously nationalist party for the Ukrainians, collaborated with
nationalist groups that engaged in violence.63 The formation of the Catholic Action of Ukrainian
Youth in 1933, meant for the organization and education of young Greek Catholic Ukrainians
toward the purposes of Ukrainian independence and nationalism, was headed by OUN leader
Andriy Melnyk. Sheptytsky supported Plast, an organization which developed nationalist
combatants for OUN. Despite Sheptytsky’s orations against political violence, UGCC found
common cause with OUN and other nationalist organizations due to their similar goals of
establishing an independent Ukrainian state and combatting the spread of Communism.64
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In conjunction with OUN, Sheptytsky positioned UGCC to become the champion of
Ukrainian statehood during the beginnings of World War II. The failure of Molotov-Ribbentrop
and expansion of World War II into eastern Europe allowed enough instability within Poland to
enable the Ukrainian nationalists to pursue (nominal) independence. With UGCC support, the
Proclamation of Ukrainian Independence was passed in the summer of 1941. UGCC, suing only
for the idea of a Ukrainian state, did not endorse any further nationalist plans; Sheptytsky’s
visions for a future state, such as an overtly Christian identity coupled with democratic
institutions, clashed distinctly with the ideological pursuits of the nationalists.65 The breakdown
of the OUN-UGCC relationship is further explored in the ‘Turbulent Relationships’ section of
this research.
The inability to realize a synthesis of political goals between OUN and UGCC arose from
incompatible positions within the Greek Catholic realm. Dissident voices existed within UGCC,
often clashing with the Christian patriotism of Sheptytsky and the creeping incorporation of
methods of political violence. Bishop Grygoriy Khomyshyn conflicted with his Ukrainian
nationalist colleagues in the clergy, becoming the leader of Polish loyalist members of the
church. Khomyshyn did not want the realization of Ukrainian nationhood, instead advocating for
a peaceful coexistence with Polish authorities. The Ukrainian Catholic People’s Party, composed
of Polish loyalist wings of UGCC political movements, became the main platform for
Khomyshyn’s ideas to spread. Khomyshyn’s support of Ukrainian integration into the Polish
state elicited strong condemnation from OUN and other nationalist organizations, often
threatening the bishop with assassination.66 Despite UGCC’s profound support for independence,
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the appeal of Khomyshyn’s political program negated any monolithic Greek Catholic promotion
of nationalism.
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Associated Groups
This section argues that OUN’s political actions harmed the attempt to synthesize religionational aims with UGCC. Arising from secular youth movements, Ukrainian nationalist groups
emerged in an unorganized growth that caused a fractured nationalist front to develop. Using
assassinations and political violence against opponents, OUN and the nationalist groups invited a
Polish paramilitary crackdown. Disavowing political violence, UGCC represented the reformist
wing of Ukrainian nationalism that clashed with the revolutionary tendencies of OUN.
Therefore, OUN and UGCC did not have a coherent relationship during the interwar period due
to their fundamental disagreements regarding methods of achieving statehood.
Secular Ukrainian nationalist organizations emerged from the 1890’s turn toward
youthful socialist political parties, opposed to the previous Greek Catholic iteration in the post1848 Austrian landscape. The creation of groups such as the Nationalist Ukrainian People’s
Party in 1902 and Society of Ukrainian Progressives in 1908 furthered the cause of independence
without the tether of religious affiliation. The Young Ukraine movement, championed by the
Ukrainian intelligentsia, pursued a unification of the country and a removal of foreign
occupants.67 Student-led protest groups, popular at the University of L’viv, imbued Ukrainian
nationalism with a generational ethos. Primarily using literary circles and historical revisionism,
Ukrainian political consciousness began to rise in universities. These groups dabbled in political
violence, implicating themselves in the assassination of the Polish governor of Galicia Andrzej
Potocki in 1909.68 From these roots, Ukrainian nationalists grew in prominence.
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The First World War and Ukrainian War of Independence formalized ideas of Ukrainian
nationalism into a cohesive infrastructure that consisted of a paramilitary and literary wing. The
Sich Shooters, a special Austrian military unit composed only of Ukrainian nationals, served
alongside Habsburg forces beginning in 1914. The Sich Shooters incubated future Ukrainian
nationalist military leaders such as Yevhen Konovalets and Andriy Melnyk. The ethnic
organization of the Sich Shooters allowed for ideas of Ukrainian solidarity to proliferate, seeding
the experience necessary for future military operations by nationalist groups. The Union for the
Liberation of the Ukraine arose in 1914 to spread publications advocating for a distinct
Ukrainian identity; however, the Union advocated for autonomy within the Austria, incapable of
foreseeing the eventual loss of the Central Powers and dissolution of Habsburg lands.69 With the
looming defeat of Austria, the Eastern Galicia uprising of November 1918 subverted Habsburg
rule and established the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR). Despite briefly
cooperating with the Directory, a separate political entity arising in eastern, Russian-controlled
Ukraine, ZUNR endured several turnovers in political structure and succumbed to simultaneous
Polish and Russian invasions.70 The brief taste of independence with the statehood of ZUNR
gave western Ukrainian nationalists groups disdain for their Polish occupiers. From this, the
nationalist movement would truly emerge.
The conquest of ZUNR by Poland in 1921 accelerated the growth and urgency of
Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia. Five million Ukrainians now existed within the Polish state,
composing the largest national minority.71 The repression of Ukrainian identity by the Polish
government, through the Polonization of education and colonization of Galician lands, sparked
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political violence. The Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) formed in 1920 for the distinct
purpose of rebellion against Polish rule. Founded by Colonel Yevhen Konovalets, UVO made
little attempt to engage politically with Poland. UVO exercised power through violent terrorism,
attempting to assistance Polish Marshal Josef Piludski in 1921.72 Boycotts of the 1921 Polish
census were supported by UVO. Over two thousand acts of sabotage, such as arson, were carried
out by UVO in 1922, typically against symbols of the Polish state such as post offices. UVO
were responsible for the assassination of Ukrainian writer Sydir Tverdokhlib in 1922 due to
Tverdokhlib’s support for Ukrainian integration into the Polish state. The assassination of
Tverdokhlib initiated a troubling trend among the UVO, who began to target Ukrainians deemed
“treasonous” rather than the occupying Polish government.73 Tverdokhlib’s death led to the
arrest of many key UVO members and an increase in Polish military suppression in Galicia.74
Despite Polish efforts, UVO remained the key paramilitary organization advocating for
independence.
Cracks began to emerge within UVO leadership following the 1922 Polish crackdown in
Galicia. Iulian Holovinskyi, a UVO leader, was arrested by the Polish police. The exiled ZUNR
condemned the political terrorism of UVO, advocating for a legal solution to independence.
However, ZUNR disintegrated in 1923, unable to exercise a check on UVO actions.75 Having
outlasted ZUNR, UVO became emboldened in pursuing direct action to end Polish occupation.
UVO failed to assassinate Polish President Stanislaw Wojciechowski in 1924.76 Many
Ukrainians, dissatisfied with the violent means of UVO, began to pursue political representation
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in the Polish legislative body Sejm. The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO) formed
in 1925 to pursue legal means of advocating for Ukrainian solidarity and interests. UNDO
participated in Polish elections, gaining 23 Sejm members and eight Senators in the 1928
elections. However, UNDO was targeted by UVO as gatekeepers who sought a reformation,
rather than a revolution, of the existing political structure. Seeing no political solution to the
plight of Ukrainians, UVO found little connection with UNDO.77 Other groups, such as the
Ukrainian People’s Labor Party, failed to reconcile the moderate and radical factions of the
Ukrainian nationalist movement.78 As Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia splintered, many
intellectuals and leaders sought ways to coalesce and remedy the internal rivalries.
Amid the difficulty in maintaining a western connection in Galicia, the Ukrainian
nationalist groups struggled to gather enough strength in the east. With pan-Ukrainian ambitions,
focused on uniting the Polish-controlled west with the Soviet-controlled east, Ukrainian
nationalist groups sought to consolidate support among their eastern allies. Initial
Ukrainianization policies attempted to reify national consciousness and deepen the support for
Communism within particular ethnicities during the 1920’s. The Soviets also encouraged
Ukrainian language education throughout the Leninist regime.79 The birth of the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1921, supported by the Soviets for its ability to weaken the
strength of the Russian Orthodox Church and intended to allow religious independence for
eastern Ukrainian Orthodoxy, quickly became a bastion for nationalism. The introduction of the
Stalinist regime caused the quick destruction of the autocephalous church due to its nationalist
activities, which included involvement in the Union for the Freedom of Ukraine group. The
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Union worked for property restoration for religious organizations and allegedly sought to
undermine Soviet rule. The group’s persecution as a secessionist movement eliminated many
pro-independence intellectuals and politicians in eastern Ukraine.80 The reversals of
Ukrainianization by Stalin stymied the growth of nationalism in eastern Ukraine due to the
destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and repression of anti-Soviet
agitation.
The horrendous humanitarian crisis of the Great Famine of 1932-33 devastated any
attempts to mount a strong Ukrainian nationalist resistance against the Soviet Union, further
hindering the ability of western Ukrainians to reach their eastern counterparts. The death of
between five to seven million Ukrainians, coupled with the demoralization of the Ukrainian
peasant, robbed any nationalist revolutionary potential from the countryside. Following the Great
Famine, “millions left for the cities and any potential that rural areas once had for political
mobilization disappeared”.81 The origins of the Great Famine and the intentions of the crisis are
disputed by scholars, as some argue that it was not manufactured to directly affect Ukrainian
nationalists. However, the eradication of millions of Ukrainian peasants uprooted any strong
collective strength toward a nationalist revolt.82 Despite creating a casus belli for Ukrainian
nationalists against the Soviet Union, the Great Famine contributed to the suppression of national
fervor from the countryside. Without a potential partner in eastern Ukraine due to Soviet
interference, the western Ukrainian nationalist groups could not source cross-border
collaboration with an allied organization.
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The fragmented approaches and factions aimed toward achieving Ukrainian statehood
failed to make a meaningful contribution to independence, thus necessitating an organizational
realignment. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) formed in February 1929 during
a summit in Vienna between the various parties within the nationalist movement. OUN
committed to the use of terrorism to gather popular support against the Polish occupation.83 OUN
drew its political philosophy from the works of Dmytro Dontsov, a committed Ukrainian
nationalist. Dontsov advocated for an “active nationalism”, focusing on the necessity of power
and struggle in the global contest of maintaining state sovereignty. Constructing Ukraine as a
spiritually European race, composed in opposition to Russian civilization, Dontsov viewed
Ukraine as a particular people that held a unique historical struggle for statehood.84 Dontsov’s
Foundation of Our Politics praised the Catholic heritage of Ukraine, dismissing Orthodox
counterparts due to their connection to Russia. This viewpoint gained the support of UGCC,
which became a publisher of Dontsov’s works. Dontsov sought to meld Catholicism with
Ukrainian nationalism, desiring a religio-national identity that could provide strong bonds
between Ukrainians.85 Dontsov was a proponent of integral nationalism, believing that
decentralized democratic institutions would work best in an independent Ukraine.86 With the
theoretical backing of Dontsov, OUN organized for tangible political action.
The beginnings of OUN represented a stronger representation of Ukrainian nationalism
within Poland. While UNDO disagreed with OUN’s support of terrorist tactics, they implicitly
aligned with OUN through their mutual support of Ukrainian independence. OUN committed a
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recorded 191 violent acts in cities where Ukrainians were the majority population, often
attacking Polish property. OUN’s attacks on Polish property-owners initiated a further wave of
arrests and Polish police repression. OUN responded to the increased Polish presence by
orchestrating the assassination of Tadeusz Holowko, a deputy leader within the Sejm and
policymaker of the repression campaign.87 In 1932, OUN assassinated Emilian Czechowski, the
chief of police in L’viv.88 The wave of OUN assassinations reached a culmination with the June
1934 assassination of Bronislaw Pieracki. Pieracki, the Polish Minister of Interior, was killed in
Warsaw. The assassination of Pieracki began the most comprehensive Polish crackdown in
Galicia, in which internment camps were formed to house 3,000 suspects involved with the cause
of Ukrainian nationalism. The Polish government arrested over 800 OUN members, gutting the
movement of its core constituency. Sheptytsky and Ukrainian emigres committed to the
nationalist cause condemned OUN for their continued assassination campaign.89 The violence of
OUN and resulting crackdowns in Galicia caused a faction of OUN supporters in 1935 to form
Zov, an alternative organization. Zov’s leadership were all assassinated by OUN, causing Zov to
disband quickly. The crackdowns in Galicia caused Colonel Konovalets to escape to western
Europe. Konovalets was assassinated in Rotterdam in 1938. In total, OUN achieved 63
assassinations between 1921 and 1939, of which only eleven were political figures and 52 were
Polish collaborators (mostly Ukrainians). 90 The hopes of OUN were shattered by the end of the
interwar period, having failed to create an independent Ukrainian state.
Turbulent Relationships
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This section argues that the relationship between OUN and UGCC, arranged due to pure
convenience against the mutual enemy of Communism, rested on a flawed philosophical
foundation that suffered from political disagreements and violence. In attempting to create a
national mythos, OUN and UGCC argued over secular or spiritual influence and primacy in
forging a universal or Christian conception of Ukrainian statehood. OUN assassinations of
UGCC-adjacent figures reignited harmful tension regarding political violence despite an
intelligentsia-driven attempt to cultivate a faith-based nationalism. OUN and UGCC lacked the
ability to synthesize political aims largely due to their philosophical differences and antagonistic
political actions.
UGCC and OUN attempted to cooperate during the interwar period to achieve their
similar political aspirations. Sheptytsky believed a symbiotic relationship between religion and
nationalism could be useful for realizing the goal of Ukrainian statehood. OUN’s nationalist
outlook could operate diametrically and inspire opposition against Sheptytsky’s ultimate fear: the
spread of Communism throughout Galicia. This convenient partnership between UGCC and
OUN relied upon their antithetical beliefs toward Communism.91 Sheptytsky viewed the battle
against Communism as a “cosmic battle” countering an atheistic and material political
philosophy.92 With a paramilitary partner in OUN, Sheptytsky had the material forces to pursue
his political platform.
The turmoil of the UGCC and OUN relationship primarily lies with the disparate
philosophical grounding of the religious and secular nationalist groups. OUN viewed the state as
the highest unity and the focus of all revolutionary goals. Without the existence of the state,

91
92

Shekhovtsov, “By cross and sword”, 278.
Shekhovtsov, 279.

37

Ukrainian identity could not be fully and authentically realized.93 Toward the end of obtaining
the state, violence was explicitly endorsed by OUN. As the manifestation of the philosophy of
Dontsov, OUN viewed itself as a political religion. With documents such as the “Ten
Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist” and ceremonies involving vigils held at the
tombstones of fallen comrades, OUN created a nationalistic mythos around the independence
movement. Acts of terrorism, such as assassinations, were viewed as a path toward martyrdom.94
OUN activist Dmytro Shtykalo stated that “nationalism requires faith in the nation, not in
God”.95 The ethics of the nationalist movement emerged from secular positions to avoid internal
religious disputes and acknowledge the positioning of material aspirations above spiritual
considerations.96 OUN’s primary worship was not of God, but of the realization of political
means through the Ukrainian state.
However, UGCC and OUN did not establish a friendly relationship during the interwar
period. The use of political violence by OUN was bitterly met by Sheptytsky, who condemned
the 1934 assassination spree that resulted in Minister Pieracki’s death. Through an understanding
of Christianity’s nonaggression, Sheptytsky could not outright support OUN’s violence. The
placement of UGCC inside of the nationalist conversation drew criticism from secular
nationalists, who reviled the growth of the church’s influence. The formation of UGCC youth
movements, which competed with OUN’s youth development programs, arose fears of a
redirection of the emergent nationalist cohort toward religious matters. 97 Despite this, OUN
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leader Andriy Melnyk became the leader of the Catholic Association of Ukrainian Youth.98 This
coincided with Sheptytsky’s desire to reform OUN’s direction toward Catholic nationalism.
Many religious and traditionalist Ukrainians lacked interest in the secular initiatives of OUN.
The limited bandwidth of the nationalist movement, and the disagreement regarding the use of
violence, caused clashes between the secular and religious movements struggling to achieve
ideological supremacy.
The assassination of Ivan Babiy, the leader of the Organization for Catholic Action and
the Ukrainian Academic Gymnasium, in 1934 by OUN forces caused the deepest fracture with
UGCC. Babiy was targeted by OUN for supposed Polish sympathies, concurrent with OUN’s
primary focus on ridding Ukraine of malcontent traitors to the independence movement. The
position of Babiy within the Catholic organizational structure showed his adjacent role to UGCC
interests. With the assassination of Babiy, OUN used fears of Polish collaboration to tread on the
hierarchy of UGCC. Sheptytsky stated that Babiy “became the victim of Ukrainian terrorists,
trembling horror shocked all people. Murdering for no reason, except because they did not like
the educational activity of the deceased… the holy cause cannot be served with bloody hands.”99
However, Sheptytsky’s condemnations were purely verbal; UGCC continued to partner with
OUN throughout the interwar period and Second World War, albeit through a strained relation.
OUN’s religious policies were mixed toward their support of UGCC. Religion was
viewed as an internal matter and prompted OUN to promote freedom of worship. Faiths that
encouraged universalism and did not actively uphold Ukrainian national identity were rejected.
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OUN envisioned the state as a supporter of religious education, only if the religion supported
morality that upheld state sanctity. To encourage a mutually beneficial relationship, in which
religion could be molded to become a vehicle for national identity, OUN promised state support
for a national church.100 Despite OUN’s aversion to proclaiming a sole religious identity,
organizational leaders saw a pragmatic possibility in aligning with UGCC. Dontsov’s work
Church and Nationalism pointed to a partnership between Catholicism and nationalism in
creating the state’s future spirit. OUN member Maksym Orlyk advised in 1940 that religion
could be united with nationalism in a dualistic combat against materialism and Communism. The
most prominent OUN member of the Second World War, Stepan Bandera, was the son of Greek
Catholics and concurred that the Ukrainian spirit could be successfully combined with
Christianity.101 The relationship between OUN and UGCC was contingent on faith’s ability to
sculpt a national spirit, cultivate morality, and act as a bulwark against competing politics.
UGCC’s aversion to OUN was not limited only to the use of political violence: secular
nationalism and the political philosophy of the Ukrainian nationalists stood in contrast to
UGCC’s Christian background. Sheptytsky’s pursuit of Christian patriotism rather than
Ukrainian nationalism is understood as being that “our nation, the Ukrainian people, [would]
love with Christian love more than other nations and are ready to give for it the work of one’s
whole life and even life itself”.102 UGCC gave priority to upholding Christian values in the future
state rather than perpetuating a secular national spirit. OUN’s placement of the nation above God
engendered unrest from Sheptytsky, who sought an inversion in which Ukrainian’s Christian
character would be emphasized over a constructed national mythos. Sheptytsky believed
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nationalism “is close to paganism. In its program, instead of God, places people, visually state,
placing its interests above all others”.103 OUN’s emphasis on Ukraine’s struggle to form a state,
and promotion of purely temporal interests, clashed with the Christian worldview of UGCC.
Attempts were made by Christian and nationalist thinkers to synthesize UGCC and OUN
platforms to allow for a coherent relationship. Konstantyn Chekhovych, a Greek Catholic
scholar, attempted to reconcile religion and nationalism as a necessity before the true formation
of a strong Ukrainian identity. Another Christian nationalist, Father Dzerovych, sought a
Christian nationalist ideology as the only strong solution against the tide of Communism. The
publication of Nationalism and Catholicism by Mykola Konrad in 1934 allowed for an increase
of popularity for Christian nationalism. Konrad argued that despite nationalism’s secular nature
and placement of man above God, Christianity must coexist and align with nationalist endeavors
due to their mutual hatred of Communism. Konrad also advocated for nationalism due to its
rejection of unbridled capitalism, which subverted religious norms and degraded traditions. The
similar ethos of nationalism and Christianity, Konrad contended, could unite into a political and
religious force against oppositional forces.104 The convenient arrangement of UGCC and OUN
against Communism was riddled with fundamental disagreements that hamstrung efforts to fully
synthesize toward the Ukrainian national ideal.
The Second World War
This section argues that the Second World War ended any potential political synthesis of
religio-national aims within the Ukrainian independence movement. The dual assaults of
Germany and the Soviet Union on Ukraine were causal components of the collapse of OUN’s
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internal coherence into distinctive camps, while UGCC was dismissed as a political force due to
a changing leadership hierarchy and repression from German occupiers. Arrests, persecution, and
the ultimate annexation of Ukraine by the Soviet Union disrupted the already-tenuous
relationship between OUN and UGCC. With the end of the Second World War, OUN and
UGCC’s relationship ended due to disintegrating interest in Ukrainian statehood and a massive
loss of political capital for both organizations.
The outbreak of World War II into eastern Europe readjusted the delicate balance that
bound UGCC and OUN toward their similar goals and caused a territorial realignment that
removed Polish power in Galicia. The rise of National Socialist Germany during the 1930’s
offered a key source of support for OUN: Colonel Konovalets used contacts within the German
intelligence agency to extract material support and training, particularly in 1939. Germany’s
invasion of Poland and promise to avoid the Soviets through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact raised
OUN hopes of forming a breakaway Ukrainian state.105 However, the German reversal of
Molotov-Ribbentrop in 1941 upset OUN’s strategy, forcing Ukrainian nationalism to encounter
two opposing forces on Galician territory: the expansionary German invasion and the eternal foe,
Communist Russia. OUN’s alignment during World War II would define the future of the
Ukrainian nation.
However, OUN did not muster a unified front through which Ukrainian nationalist
interests could be pursued because of a persistent generational gap and political stance toward
radicalism. While older members of OUN typically desired a moderate and pragmatic path
toward independence, the youth wing’s disillusion with the rapidity of nationalist progress
inspired an attraction to violent revolution. This split caused a deep fracture within OUN. Under
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the leadership of Stepan Bandera, the youth wing of OUN formed a separate, breakaway
organization in 1941: OUN-B. The moderate members of OUN formed OUN-M, led by Andriy
Melnyk. Due to their support among Ukrainian youth, OUN-B gained an upper hand as the most
prominent nationalist group.106 Both groups sought Ukrainian independence, albeit through
separate means. The split of OUN into separate groups harmed the ability of Ukrainian
nationalists to assert power, having reached internal crisis.
The invading German forces in Galicia were viewed as liberators by OUN-B/M, eliciting
an eager partnership. In June of 1941, during the beginnings of the German-Soviet conflict,
OUN-B/M members emphasized to Adolf Hitler their desire for national independence and hope
for cooperation. German successes in Galicia against the Soviets gave Ukrainian nationalists a
firm belief in the eventual formation of their own sovereign state. The Ukrainian National
Assembly passed the Proclamation of June 30th, which affirmed a commitment toward the
formation of the Ukrainian state following the conclusion, and supposed success, of the German
invasion. However, OUN-B/M’s naivety toward German intentions was realized quickly:
Commissar Erich Koch, the German provincial leader established in Ukraine, dismissed notions
that Germany was concerned about Ukrainian freedom.107 Germany’s primary political desire in
Ukraine was the establishment of Galicia as a colony, in which German leadership would retain
administrative capability.108 Without German support of Ukrainian statehood, nationalist groups
began to resist their new occupiers.
Beginning in July 1941, OUN-B members began to view their German occupiers with
hostility. Stepan Bandera’s arrest on July 7th, 1941 by German paramilitary forces gave impetus
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for OUN-B to initiate armed revolt. Viewed as a source of instability and potential leader of a
nationalist uprising, Germany detained Bandera in Berlin. OUN-B’s new leader, Mykola Lebed,
reaffirmed his faction’s resistance to German occupation in September 1941. Around forty
publishers of nationalist literature were executed by Germany in December 1941. OUN-B’s plea
in April 1942 to maintain the goal of Ukrainian independence caused German administrators to
order the arrest of all OUN-B members. Having seen the treatment of their revolutionary wing,
OUN-M joined the resistance to German occupation in May 1942.109 The repression of OUN-B
and late turn of OUN-M debilitated the ability of Ukrainian nationalists to properly respond to
the German invasion between 1941 and 1942.
While nationalist groups struggled to confront Germany, UGCC faced political
repression and an inability to properly ingratiate itself into the nationalist conversation. Initially,
Sheptytsky showed strong support for OUN-B’s revolutionary message. Sheptytsky welcomed
the Germans as liberating forces, ordering German flags to be hung at UGCC churches.110 After
discovering the betrayal of Germany regarding Ukrainian independence, Sheptytsky desired a
unification of Ukrainian nationalism. On July 7th, 1941, Sheptytsky pled with Melnyk to
reconcile OUN-M and OUN-B. However, with the arrest of Bandera and lingering ideological
divisions, Melnyk never responded to Sheptytsky’s appeals.111 UGCC’s nationalist sidelining
was compounded by a German disdain for the Greek Catholic’s harboring of Ukrainian national
identity. Germany favored Ukrainian Orthodoxy, allowing Orthodox churches to open and use
Ukrainian in their sermons. Germany persecuted Catholicism throughout Ukraine, closing
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churches and killing seventeen priests in western Volhynia.112 The death of Sheptytsky on
November 1st, 1944, removed the strongest advocate for Ukrainian independence from the
church’s ranks.113 UGCC lost political power throughout World War II, becoming a marginal
actor in the wartime nationalist movement.
The eventual reconciliation of OUN-B and OUN-M in the latter years of World War II
allowed for a unified response to the wrestled occupation of western Ukraine by Germany and
the Soviet Union. At the Third Extraordinary Congress of 1943, some Ukrainian nationalists
condemned OUN-B and associated Banderite organizations.114 OUN-B underwent leadership
changes throughout 1943 given the strong repression of their revolutionary elements by the
Germans.115 Both factions consented to the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),
which combatted the Soviets and Germans through guerrilla warfare. By 1944, UPA had around
30,000 soldiers.116Although primarily controlled by OUN-B members, UPA effectively corralled
Ukrainian nationalists into an organized fighting force. UPA’s eastward direction gave primacy
to the defeat of Communism throughout Ukraine, but the group resisted German dominance.117
Soviet officials, party members, and military targets were primary targets during the latter years
of World War II. UPA engaged in community service projects and gave material assistance to
fellow Ukrainians to build a shared identity and garner a broader base of support. UPA, led by
Bandera following his 1944 release from Germany, was responsible for the massacre of Poles
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throughout eastern Galicia to attempt to rid Ukraine of foreign groups. Around 10,000 people
were the victims of UPA’s aggressive tactics.118 Soviet collaborators, despite being ethnically
Ukrainian, were also killed indiscriminately.119 The embattled historical legacy of UPA
highlights the ambiguity through which Ukrainians understood their battle for independence in
World War II: western Ukrainians were typically supportive of UPA, while eastern Ukrainians
shuddered at the brutality of the group.
The end of World War II cemented the fate of Ukrainian nationalism. With the collapse
of Germany and victory of the Soviet Union in eastern Europe, Ukraine was incorporated into
the Soviet structure in the immediate postwar years. The annexation of Ukraine by the Soviet
Union allowed the formal creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1945.120 The
state of the Ukrainian nationalist movement appeared bleak: with UGCC gutted by years of
German repression and the loss of Sheptytsky, UPA remained the main source of resistance to
Soviet occupation. OUN was internally weak due to divisions over the leadership of Bandera and
ideological disputes regarding the merits of fascism or democracy. With the end of the Second
World War, Ukrainian nationalism found itself in a weaker position than the interwar period.
The Decline of Ukrainian Nationalism
This section argues that the destruction of UGCC at the L’viv Synod and UPA’s political
alienation of the Ukrainian people extinguished the remnant of a religio-national identity. The
forced conversions of UGCC into Russian Orthodoxy by Soviet occupiers, coupled with the lack
of political capital exercised by the resulting Catacomb Church, abolished the potential for Greek
Catholic involvement in the Ukrainian political system. Offshoots of OUN lacked a religio-

118

Kudelia, “Choosing violence in irregular wars”, 156-158.
Wilson, “Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990s”, 51.
120
Wilson, “Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990s”, 17.
119

46

national bond, and often did not focus on achieving independent Ukrainian statehood. Following
the Second World War, OUN and UGCC’s relationship completely dissolved without ever
achieving a synthesis of political aims.
The annexation of Ukraine by the Soviet Union further hindered the potentiality of a
religio-national identity due to Soviet religious guidelines. The Stalinist regime developed a
religious policy based on enlightened atheism by 1941 and support for the Russification of
existing institutions. Religious institutions based on a particular nationality, such as the
Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church and Belorussian Orthodox Autocephalous Church,
were disbanded by the Soviet Union. Orthodoxy in Ukraine was quickly russified and engulfed
into the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church,121 thus allowing for greater Soviet control.
Postwar Soviet religious repression of certain churches relied on several factors: size and
influence, national allegiance, behavior and support during World War II, and ethnic
composition.122 Soviets gave preferential treatment to Orthodox religions, due to their
convertibility to Moscow patriarchate control, and atheist movements due to its compatibility
with Communist thought. Catholic groups, including Polish Catholics and Ukrainian Greek
Catholics, were harshly treated due to their connection to the Vatican and ethno-religious
symbolism. In particular, UGCC’s alignment with Germany during World War II allowed the
Soviets to accuse the church of treason.123 The nature and actions of UGCC in the interwar
period and World War II made the Greek Catholics a target for Soviet repression.
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The four million Greek Catholics, spread across 4,119 churches in Ukraine in the
immediate postwar years, faced an existential challenge given Soviet control of religious
affairs.124 Having faced deportations and exterminations by the invading Soviet army during
World War II, UGCC weakened considerably.125 The Soviet Union attempted to subvert the
Greek Catholic Church during World War II. Renegade UGGC priest Havryil Kostelnyk, who
advocated for a break between UGCC and Roman communion, was fully supported by the
Soviets to cause internal instability within the church. Having failed to undermine UGCC during
World War II, the postwar era allowed full Soviet infiltration of the church. By the spring of
1945, the Soviets began to pressure Greek Catholic laity to voluntarily convert to Orthodoxy. On
April 11th, 1945, Soviet security forces arrested the UGCC leadership hierarchy and sentenced
them to forced labor for treason in allying with Germany. The Soviets recognized Kostelnyk as
the new leader of UGCC due to his advocacy of a merger with the Russian Orthodox Church
(ROC). A new clergy, composed of pro-Soviet priests and supported by ROC, agitated for a
union between UGCC and the Orthodox community. UGCC clergy were forced to attend
conferences organized by Soviet officials, as the pro-Soviet component gained increasing
prominence: 49% of UGCC clergy were aligned with Moscow.126 UGCC transformed from a
hotbed of Ukrainian national identity to a Soviet-controlled organization.
The destruction of UGCC occurred between March 8th to 10th, 1946 during the L’viv
Sobor. Having firmly subverted the nationalistic UGCC, the Soviet Union aroused sufficient
sympathy to the cause of Orthodox union. The L’viv Sobor liquidated UGCC and forcibly
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converted its members to Orthodoxy. The practice of Greek Catholicism was banned by Soviet
authorities: the use of Greek Catholic rites and proselytizing were forbidden.127 UGCC churches
were converted to Orthodox churches. Pope Pius XII expressed sorrow for the destroyed Greek
Catholic Church in a 1946 address, condemning the forceful conversion of believers by the
Soviets,128 but the Vatican was slow to bring international attention to the plight of UGCC. Some
Greek Catholics easily converted to Orthodoxy due to the shared roots and traditions of the
faiths; others did so as a method of escaping further persecution by the Soviets.129 However,
other Greek Catholics refused to convert to Orthodoxy. Orthodoxy’s connection to Moscow and
the nationalist history of UGCC could not be reconciled. For many Ukrainian nationalists within
UGCC, union with the Russian enemy was impossible.130 Animosity toward the pro-Soviet wing
of UGCC caused dissidents to assassinate Kostelnyk for treason in September 1948. The end of
UGCC’s official existence drove the faith underground.
The disbandment of UGCC led the now-dissident faith to form a “Catacomb Church” that
perpetuated Greek Catholicism. The Catacomb Church was the largest banned religious group in
the Soviet Union. Many clergy and laity that had been imprisoned by the Soviets in the
immediate postwar years returned during the 1950’s to form experienced leadership and carry
out rites for the Church. The Catacomb Church operated secretly in converted Orthodox
churches or in private homes. The Church had around 300 priests. However, these priests were
subject to Soviet harassment: the arrest of Vasyl Velychkovsky in 1969 and three Catacomb
priests in 1973 who distributed Greek Catholic prayer books highlighted the repression.131 The
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Ukrainian Herald, a dissident newspaper, provided support for the Catacomb Church and
highlighted Soviet abuses. Father Budzynsky, a Greek Catholic priest, maintained criticism of
the L’viv Synod throughout the postwar era.132 However, the Catacomb Church could not muster
the same volume of nationalist agitation as UGCC. Greek Catholics, despite being banned in
Soviet Ukraine, found sources of resistance.
While the Soviets liquidated UGCC, the continued existence of violent nationalist
organizations plagued the pacification of Ukraine throughout the postwar era. UPA remained
active, responding to Soviet repression through targeted violence. The spread of farm
collectivization in Ukraine signaled to UPA the forced capitulation of the peasantry to the
Soviets. UPA attacked collectivized farms, causing extensive violence, and attempted to sway
Ukrainian peasants to revolt against the Soviets. However, the usage of violence by UPA
alienated the peasantry and caused many civilians to view Soviet control as an acceptable
alternative. Thus, with collectivization spurred by Soviet officials who acknowledged its
neutering nationalist effect, support for UPA collapsed among the general public.133 UPA soon
withered.
The legacy of OUN and UPA in the fight for Ukrainian independence was carried by
offshoot organizations that resisted Soviet rule. However, these organizations rarely operated
alongside religious institutions. The Ukrainian Workers’ and Peasants’ Union, operational
between 1958 and 1961, desired Ukrainian independence but aligned with the Leninist
movement. The Shistdesiatnyky movement championed Ukrainian language but was not
explicitly ethno-nationalist or religious and was repressed heavily throughout the 1960’s.134 The
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closest descendant of OUN was the Ukrainian National Front and Committee in Defense of the
Catholic Church in Ukraine, both of which were Galician-based and prominent during the
1970’s. However, the localized nature of these organizations and lack of mobilized support
caused the OUN legacy organizations to collapse. Many other small nationalist groups, plagued
by in-fighting over ideology and history, failed to materialize any wholesale changes to the
Ukrainian postwar condition.135
V. Conclusion
This research analyzed the presence of religious nationalism in Ukraine from the interwar
to postwar era. To this end, the relationship between UGCC and Ukrainian nationalist groups
was discussed. Using the Ukrainian case study, the following hypothesis was tested: if religious
institutions and nationalist groups can synthesize spiritual and political aims, then religionationalism can form. The analysis of the Ukrainian case provides support for this hypothesis.
Ukrainian religio-nationalism did not exist, lingering in an undeveloped, weak, and
uncooperative form. The failure of UGCC and Ukrainian nationalists to reach full partnership,
and the lack of a true religious thrust to the ideal of Ukrainian independence, hindered the
growth of religious nationalism. However, the degree of cooperation between UGCC and the
Ukrainian nationalists showed a dim presence of religio-national identity. Particularly,
Sheptytsky’s Christian patriotism and the numerous attempts to integrate Ukrainian nationalism
with religion by authors such as Konrad and Chekhovych reveals the glimmer of potentiality for
religio-national identity in Ukraine.
The failure of religio-national identity to fully blossom in Ukraine, beyond a basic and
feeble growth, can be attributed to geographic and ethnographic considerations. Ukraine’s strong
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Orthodox bastion in the east, and the inability of Greek Catholicism to fully unite Ukrainians
under a single religious moniker, was perhaps the underlying reason for religio-nationalism’s
absence. UGCC remained strong in western Ukraine, but ecumenical failures and
denominational suspicions did not facilitate a single religio-national identity throughout Ukraine.
The multilayered national identities of western and eastern Ukraine, given the presence of groups
identifying as Polish and Russian, further harmed a unified identity formation. Polonization and
Russophilia displaced the full formation of Ukrainian national identity. Therefore, UGCC and
the Ukrainian nationalists did not receive unanimous support and therefore were not suitable
vehicles for identity formation.
Religio-national identity struggled to fully form in Ukraine due to the insufficient
partnership between UGCC and the Ukrainian nationalists to synthesize their spiritual and
political aims. UGCC could not fully integrate with the Ukrainian nationalists due to their
disagreements regarding political aims. The issue of political violence and assassinations
perpetuated by UVO and OUN meant that UGCC did not lend full support to the organizations.
UGCC’s condemnation of violence as a method of achieving national independence conflicted
with the essential aims of the Ukrainian nationalists, who pursued a violent uprising against
Poland. The assassination of Ivan Babiy by OUN emphasized the lack of cooperation between
religion and nationalism: through the death of Babiy, a Catholic activist, OUN signaled a
disregard for giving primary consideration to their relationship with UGCC. The strained
relationship following Babiy’s assassination created strong tensions and revealed that the issue of
political violence could not be reconciled. Generally, UGCC and OUN’s disagreement regarding
violence exposes that religio-nationalist movements must agree on the issue of finding a political
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or revolutionary solution. Therefore, a religio-national identity can not arise if unsettled
differences exist regarding the merits of reformer or revolutionary mentalities.
Conceptions of nationalism were not reconciled by UGCC and the Ukrainian nationalists,
meaning a united form of national identity could not be realized. Christian patriotism, the pet of
Sheptytsky’s nationalist tendency, was not popular in nationalist circles. OUN, for example,
explicitly pursued secular nationalism in achieving Ukrainian independence. Christian patriotism
and secular nationalism was not effectively integrated through the works of Chekhovych, Orlyk,
Konrad, and Dontsov. Despite the efforts of the intelligentsia, Christian nationalism did not
become the vehicle for Ukrainian independence. OUN’s commitment to secularism, perhaps to
avoid upsetting Orthodox groups or atheist elements, clashed with the commitment to spreading
and upholding Christian values through UGCC. Spiritual values could not be aligned between
UGCC and the Ukrainian nationalist groups due to the primacy of God or State in each
movement. UGCC’s criticism of OUN’s placement of achieving the Ukrainian state as the prime
directive of the movement, instead of creating a Christian state, was the main source of conflict.
OUN, becoming itself a political religion through its stylized and unique ceremonies regarding
national identity, did not explicitly adopt a Christian worldview. Dontsov’s Darwinistic view of
nationhood and struggle did not reconcile with Sheptytsky’s goal of achieving a Christian state.
The lack of a spiritual synthesis in Ukrainian nationalism shows that religio-national identities
rely upon harmonious platforms, or negotiated compromises, to become fully achieved.
Beyond the explicit religio-national relationship in Ukraine, the splintering of Ukrainian
nationalism harmed the formation of a concrete movement during the interwar and Second
World War era. Despite the ability of the nationalists to coalesce around OUN following the
collapse of UVO, infighting continued to burden the movement for independence. OUN’s

53

splintering into the Bandera and Melnyk camps diffused power among two oppositional groups,
thus weakening the intensive influence wielded by the nationalists. OUN’s split between
moderates and revolutionaries caused the Ukrainian nationalist movement to fracture and hurt its
ability to respond to large-scale crises in a unified manner. The formation of UPA during the
Second World War was the closest manner of nationalist reunification, but UPA’s
ineffectiveness in rallying Ukrainian civilians through its usage of violent intimidation harmed
viability. Additionally, UPA’s struggle in fighting both Germany and the Soviet Union caused
issues of human capital due to the sustained losses and pronged approach that diluted UPA’s
overall impact. The conquest of Ukraine by the Soviets sounded the end of UPA as effective
repression and dismantling of leadership apparatuses caused the nationalist movement to fade
into irrelevancy for the subsequent decades. Having been plagued by internal disputes and
ultimately disbanded by the consolidation of Soviet power throughout Ukraine, the nationalist
movement did not form a unified identity.
Similarly, UGCC was unable to create a lasting religio-national legacy. The death of
Sheptytsky indicated the end of explicit nationalist support by Greek Catholic leadership. The
rise of Polish and later Soviet apologists such as Khomyshyn further revealed UGCC’s swing
toward reconciliation with foreign powers controlling Ukraine. The L’viv Synod of 1946,
ushering the full destruction of UGCC, ended the ability for the church to operate openly and
effect political change. The effective Soviet repression of Greek Catholicism, which
acknowledged its potential as an agent for nationalist fervor, led to a weakened underground
movement that did not have enough influence to mobilize action. The Catacomb Church allowed
nationalist Greek Catholics to exercise dissidence against the Soviets, but it could not mount a
dedicated challenge to the regime without legal authority to operate. Despite acting as a vehicle
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for underground Ukrainian nationalism, the Catacomb Church did not effect wholesale change to
the political environment. Therefore, Ukrainian religio-nationalism lacked a strong religious
aspect following the interwar era due to the death of Sheptytsky and dissolution at the L’viv
Synod.
The lack of a religio-national identity in Ukraine during these critical eras could be a
component of the modern-day weakness of Ukrainian identity. A splintered national identity in
Ukraine, aided by Russian intervention, contributed to the post-Euromaidan revolution in the
east. Faced with distinct ethnicities and multilayered identities in eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian
state did not have a unified vision of national, nor remotely religious, identity. Disputes over
what it meant to be Ukrainian, and the validity of such an identity, led to tensions that spilled
into armed conflict. While the strain between Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy was not a
primary contributing factor to the ongoing conflict, it is apparent that religion lacked a strong
identification force in modern Ukraine. Future research could examine the linkages between the
stunted growth of Ukrainian religio-nationalism from the interwar era and the present conflict in
eastern Ukraine. This could unveil the extent of which a lack of religio-national identity
contributed to the weakness of modern Ukrainian nationalism.
In conclusion, religio-nationalism can only be formed through a synthesized spiritual and
political platform between religion institutions and nationalist groups. Factors such as infighting
and external repression can contribute to the degree through which each segment can represent
their interests. Although a partnership can be achieved between religious institutions and
nationalist groups, a fully symbiotic identity cannot be achieved without an integrated approach.
The Ukrainian case study shows the issues that arise in attempting to formulate a religio-national
identity. While other states have successfully integrated a religio-national identity, Ukraine’s
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absence indicates the means through which a people cannot imbue their national identity with
religious connotations. If a strong harmonization between religious institutions and nationalist
groups cannot occur, then religio-nationalism will not form.
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